

REMARKS

UPON TWO

1020. m. 2

PAMPHLETS²

Written by the late A. C. Esq;

CONCERNING

Human Liberty and Necessity.

In which it is proved,

Upon his own PRINCIPLES, and as near as possible
in his very WORDS,

Either that GOD is an Agent, and Man also an Agent:

Or, that

If Man is no Agent, GOD is no Agent.

But that all things whatever, are Patients, acted upon,
even while there are no Agents to act upon them.

By *PHILLIPS GREYTON*, A.M. K-
Rector of *SPRINGFIELD* in *ESSEX*.

Qui probat nimis, probat nihil.

L O N D O N :

Printed for *STEPHEN AUSTEN*, at the
Angel and Bible in *St. Paul's Churchyard*. 1730.

[Price One Shilling.]



Written by the late A. C. R. R.

Human Liberty and Virtue

WATERLAND

Upon his own property, and a part of the

in his own

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To the REVEREND

DANIEL WATERLAND, D.D.

THE late *A. C.* Esq; having sufficiently perplex'd the Question concerning HUMAN LIBERTY and NECESSITY; and so far entangled it, by committing the various Explications, which at different times had been given of it, as to make it extremely difficult for an *English* Reader to unravel it; and not easy for the most learned, without many Words, and a multitude of tedious Observations, to set it right again: it was consider'd whether one Uniform and Entire Method might not be found out, to bring Him to a Sight of his Mistakes, and of the Inconsistency of his Notions.

AND the Attempt being thus made, is now justly referred to you, who are not only

watchful that the main and fundamental Articles of Christianity, be neither openly subverted, nor covertly undermined; but careful also that no other the Essential Points of Natural and Revealed Religion be either neglected or expos'd.

AND it having been my Fortune to embark in the same good and laudable Design. I take this Occasion to testify to the World, that as in you I have found the most able Judge; so also have I experienced the most Generous and Candid Friend.

I am,

Your most Obliged,

most Humble Servant,

Phillips Gretton.

P R E-



PREFACE.



THE following Sheets were drawn up in the Life-time of the late A. C. Esq; and designedly address'd to Him, in the Form of a Letter, in order to inquire of Him, upon his own Principles, How One Intelligent Being might be free, and another not so? He having acknowledged in his latter Piece, that God is free: And that it is a Contradiction, in Terms, to suppose Him not so.

SUCH, then, was judged the most Obvious, and easy Method, to show Him the Inconsistency of his Principles; and to let others in to the gross Absurdities, and palpable Contradictions of them.

AND, for this purpose also, the Consideration of all his other Topics, and Arguments was laid aside; that there might be no Deviation from this main Design.

AND

AND if this Method did not prove sufficient, it was conceived, there might be still Room, and Time, to add any thing, farther requisite upon these Subjects.

BUT the Copy not coming to the Press, before the Decease of the late A. C. Esq; it was thought advisable to send this Work forth, in the Way of Remarks only, and of such, as any other Person might equally reply to, if He should think fit.

AND this I was the more inclined to, because I had heard also, that the last Pamphlet herein remark'd upon, was not the Performance of the late A. C. Esq; but of some other living Person.

NOW, tho' this did not seem likely to Me, I was resolved to have some Regard thereunto also. And have only supposed that both Books, being built upon the same Principles, were the Works of One and the same Person.

IF this also be an Error, as I have now publish'd my Remarks, I think it cannot prove a material One. Not to mention that it is common to Me with the Reverend Mr. Jackson, who hath already undertaken, not only to make good, whatever the late Dr. Samuel Clarke, hath at any time written upon these Subjects; but also to make good the Point of Human Liberty, against all Opposition whatever.

THE

T H E said Reverend Mr. Jackson hath also touch'd upon the Method, here insisted upon, by Me, as is plain from an Extract I have seen of his Work. But, if it may be thought no Incroachment upon his Province, that I have dwelt more largely, upon what He hath more cursorily handled, as I think it will not : I am sure, I shall be no way displeased to find, (for his Performance I have not yet seen) that He hath left nothing farther, for Me to do.

N E I T H E R are Mr. Jackson and I, the only Persons, who conceive that the Liberty of all intelligent Beings, stand upon One, and the same Foot, and Bottom. The ingenious Mr. Conybeare hath express'd Himself so appositely, and fully upon this Head, I crave leave to subjoin also his Words.

* 'Tis certain, We have a Liberty of Action. This We experience in ourselves. And whatever Arguments are urged against it, will equally conclude against the placing Liberty in any other Being. And yet it is strictly demonstrable, there must be Liberty somewhere or other.

T H E following Attempt is design'd as a Praxis upon the aforesaid Principles. And tho' it is not my Business to determine, Whe-

* See his excellent Sermon on the Credibility of the Gospel-Mysteries. especially pag. 15. Edit. 2.

ther, in fact, I have made such Point evident or not; I think I may be allowed to conclude, that it is in itself, still, a Point strictly Demonstrable, that the same Arguments which seemingly hold against Liberty, in one intelligent Being; conclude, as strongly, against Freedom in any other. I am, candid and impartial Reader,

Your Obedient

Humble Servant

Phillips Gretton.

REMARKS



REMARKS

Upon Two PAMPHLETS,

CONCERNING
Human Liberty and Necessity.



HAVE read the late Dissertati-
on concerning *Human Liberty* and
Necessity, subscribed *A. C. Esq;*
and likewise * a former Treatise,
of which a Gentleman lately de-
ceased hath equally the Credit,
with great Impartiality and Application of Mind,
but instead of being convinc'd thereby, I find
my self the more confirmed in my former Opi-
nions, concerning *Human Liberty* and Free-
Will. It may, perhaps, be of no Diservice to
others, to hear upon what Principles I proceed-
ed, in thus satisfying my self; they may there-

* *A Philosophical Enquiry concerning Human Liberty.*

2d Edit. Robinson.

fore, if they please, peruse them in the following Sheets.

IN the former Treatise, tho' Endeavours were used to take from Men all Freedom from Necessity, yet the Author was pleased to leave us a kind of necessary Agents; but, in the latter Piece, as there is Progression still in Error, we are allowed only to be necessary Patients. Not indeed much for the Honour of the Rational Creation; but such was a Point, the Author, as I conceive, had not much at heart, at that time.

HOWEVER, that is not, what I design to debate with him, at present. What now I am most concerned to find, is, That his Principles have left no such thing as Liberty or Free-Agency in the World: Notwithstanding the Author was so seasonably cautioned, by his very good Friend, the late Dr *Samuel Clarke*, where his Principles must and would end in these Words. *

‘ JUDGING is one thing and acting is another,
‘ they depend upon Principles totally different;
‘ and which have no Connection with Activeness

* See Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity, p. 9.

Also in Dr Clarke's Collection of Papers, between Him and Leibnetz. Appendix. Answer to the first Letter, p. 406. *

Also second Answer, p. 409, 410. Knapton.

‘ and

‘ and Passiveness. Neither God, nor Men can
 ‘ avoid seeing that to be true, which they see to
 ‘ be true : or judging that to be reasonable,
 ‘ which they see is reasonable ; but in all this,
 ‘ there is no Action.

‘ THE physical Power of acting, which both
 ‘ in God, and Man, is the Essence of Liberty,
 ‘ continues exactly the same, after the last Judg-
 ‘ ment, as before.

‘ THE Sum is this. There is no Connection
 ‘ between Approbation and Action. Between
 ‘ what is passive, and what is active. The
 ‘ Spring of Action, is not the Understanding.
 ‘ For a Being incapable of Action, might be
 ‘ capable of Perception. But the Spring of A-
 ‘ ction is the self-motive Power, in Animal Crea-
 ‘ tures Spontaneity, in Rational Liberty.

‘ IF (otherwise) the final Perception of the
 ‘ Understanding, and the Operation, or Exer-
 ‘ tion, of the active Faculty, or self-motive
 ‘ Power, were connected by a true physical Ne-
 ‘ cessity ; there would remain no difference be-
 ‘ tween Action and Passion,

‘ NAY, there would be no such thing as A-
 ‘ ction, or an Agent, in the Universe, neither
 ‘ Man, nor Angel, nor even God himself, would

‘ act, in any other sense, than, as a Balance de-
 ‘ termined on one side by weight, supposing it
 ‘ endued with Perception and Understanding.’

NEITHER is this denied by the Author of
 the late Dissertation, either with Regard to An-
 gels, or Men. But as to God, *A. C.* endeavours
 to evade the Consequence by alledging, *

‘ THAT tho’ the final Perception of the Un-
 ‘ derstanding, and what the Doctor calls his
 ‘ self-moving Faculty, were physically connected
 ‘ in Men, yet there would be Action, strictly
 ‘ so called, that is, Freedom of Action, in the
 ‘ Universe.

‘ TO deny the first Cause, or God to be an
 ‘ Agent, *that is a strict or free Agent*, is a Con-
 ‘ tradiction in Terms. *For tho’*

‘ OUR Knowledge is too imperfect, to ac-
 ‘ count for the manner in which the Deity acts ;
 ‘ surely, it is no just Consequence that, because
 ‘ our Actions are determin’d by the last Judg-
 ‘ ment of the Understanding, and therefore ne-
 ‘ cessary, that his are so too.

* *Dissert.* p. 11, 12.

THAT were to prove things we are in the dark about, by other things, still farther removed from our Comprehension.

WHAT? are we in the dark still, whether Man be a necessary or free Agent? and that after *A. C.* hath said so much, to prove that Man, is a necessary Agent; or rather as necessary a Patient, and not free from Necessity? No: let not this, for the present, be so much as imagin'd. Let it rather be granted, a little while, and for argument sake only, that Man is a necessary Patient, and that *A. C.* Esq; hath made this as plain and clear as any thing he ever explain'd in his Life; and then let us see, upon such Concession, and such Principles, whether the Divine Being, or first Cause, is, or can be a Free-agent or not. And if God neither is, nor can be Free, upon *A. C.*'s Principles and Arguings; then, I presume, it will be sufficiently manifest, and without any thing more to do, that neither his Premises nor Conclusions, can deserve any Regard, or Consideration. Let us make this Trial in his own Words, as near as possible: and beginning with the former Treatise, conclude with the last.

A. C.'s first Argument against Liberty in Man, is drawn from Experience, manifest Experience.

For

‘ For are we not (*says he* *) determined by Pleasure and Pain, and what seems reasonable, and unreasonable to us, to judge, or Will, or act, as We are rational and intelligent Agents ?

AND, if so, is not God then, I say, or the first Cause, as a wise and intelligent Agent, determin’d likewise by Pleasure and Dislike, which, to Him, is in the room of Pain ? and by what appears reasonable and unreasonable to Him, to judge, or will, or act ?

LET any Person reconsider this Matter ; and when he hath also the Infinity and Perfection of the divine Wisdom and Knowledge, immediately in View ; and the Imperfection of human Understanding also before his Mind ; let him well weigh, whether such Disparity and Perfection of the first Cause, doth not considerably strengthen the Argument on the side of human Liberty, by vesting in God more perfect Views, and thereby making Him subject to stronger Motives, and more forcible Determinations.

IN the next Place, says *A.C.* † ‘ Let us run over the various Actions of Men, which con-

* *Inquiry concerning human Liberty*, p. 24.

† *Ibid.* p. 31, 32.

cern this Subject, and see if they do not equally plead against Liberty in Men?

WITH all my Heart, *A. C.* provided you will but give me leave afterwards, to apply your Words and Arguments, for Conviction sake, against the first Cause, and supreme Intelligent Being also.

A. C. AS to Perception of Ideas. Of this there can be no Dispute, but it is a necessary Action of Men. Since it is not even a voluntary Action. The Ideas of Sensation and Reflection offer themselves to us, whether we will or no, and we cannot reject them. We must be conscious when we think that we do think; and thereby we necessarily have the Ideas of Reflection. We must also have our Sensations when awake, and thereby necessarily receive the Ideas of Sensation.

AND as we necessarily receive Ideas, so, each Idea, is necessarily, what it is in our Minds. For it is not possible to make any thing different from itself.

THIS first Action, namely, Perception, is the Foundation and Cause of all other Actions of Men, and makes them all necessary.

FOR,

* 'FOR, in Truth, the Images, and Ideas
' in Mens Minds, are the invifible Powers,
' that constantly govern them: and to thefe they
' univerfally pay a ready Obedience.'

AND then fuppoſing the Caſe to be ſo, for
Argument and Conviction ſake, as before no-
ted, I retort again.

P. G. AS to the Divine Perception of Ideas,
there can be no Diſpute, upon A. C.'s Principles,
that ſuch is a neceſſary Action, in the firſt Cauſe,
alſo; ſince it is not even a voluntary Action in
Him. The Ideas of Senſation ariſing from the
mutual Affections between God and his Crea-
tures, and his Reflections upon them, offer them-
ſelves to the ſupreme Intelligence, whether He
will or no. And He cannot reject them.

HE muſt be conſcious when He thinks, that
he doth think; and thereby even the firſt Cauſe
muſt neceſſarily have the Ideas of Reflection.

AS God is alſo ever vigilant He muſt alſo
have ſuch Senſations and Affections, and thereby

necessarily receive the Ideas of such his Sensations and Affections.

AND as He must necessarily receive Ideas, so each Idea, is necessarily, what it is, in his Mind. For it is not possible even for Omnipotence itself, to make any thing different from itself.

THIS first Action of the divine Mind is the Foundation, and Cause of all other Actions in God, and makes them all necessary to Him. For, in truth, the Images, and Ideas in the divine Mind, are the invisible Powers, which constantly determine the supreme Being, and to these, even the first intelligent Cause pays a ready Obedience. The next Argument made use of by A. C. against Human Liberty, is this.

* A. C. The second Action of Man, is judging of Propositions. All Propositions must either appear to me self-evident, or evident from Proof: or probable, or improbable: or doubtful, or false.

* NOW these various Appearances of Propositions to me, being founded on my Capacity, and the Degree of Light, Propositions

* Inquiry, p. 33.

‘ stand in to me; I can no more change those
 ‘ Appearances in me, than I can change the Idea
 ‘ of Red raised in me.

‘ Nor can I judge contrary to these Appea-
 ‘ rances. For what is judging of Propositions,
 ‘ but judging that they appear, as they do ap-
 ‘ pear. Which I cannot avoid doing, without
 ‘ lying to myself, which is impossible.

‘ If any Man thinks he can judge a Propo-
 ‘ sition appearing to him evident, to be not e-
 ‘ vident. Or a probable Proposition, to be
 ‘ more or less probable, than it appears by the
 ‘ Proofs to be; he knows not what he says, as
 ‘ he will see if he will define his Words.’ Al-
 lowing this as before, I urge also;

P. G. The second Action of the divine Mind
 is judging of Propositions. All Propositions must
 appear to the supreme Intelligence, true, or false,
 as they are in themselves.

NOW such Appearances to the divine Mind,
 arising from the Truth, or Falshood of Proposi-
 tions in themselves, God can no more change his
 Ideas of them, than He can his Ideas of Truth,
 and Falshood.

NOR can he judge contrary to the Reality of things. For what in Him is judging of Propositions, but seeing them as they are? Which he cannot avoid doing, without acting contrary to his own essential Truth, which is impossible.

If any Man thinks the first Intelligence can judge a Proposition to be otherwise than it is, He knows not what he saith, as he will find, when he comes to settle his Idea of God, in infinite Truth and perfect Knowledge. Our Author next proceeds thus :

A. C. ' WILLING, is the third Action of Man, which I propose to consider. It is matter of daily Experience that we begin, or forbear ; continue or end several Actions, barely by a Thought, or Preference of the Mind, ordering the doing, or not doing ; the continuing, or ending such an Action.

' THIS Power of the Man thus to order the Beginning or Forbearance ; the Continuance, or ending of any Action, is called the Will ; and the actual Exercise thereof, Willing.

* Inquiry, p. 36, 37, 38.

‘ THERE are two Questions usually put about this matter. 1. Whether we are at Liberty to will, or not to will? 2. Whether we are at Liberty to will one, or the other, of two, or more Objects?

‘ AS to the first, Whether We are at Liberty to Will, or not to Will? It is manifest We have no such Liberty. For let an Action, in any Man’s Power be proposed to Him, as presently to be done: viz. as to Walk; then Will to walk or not to walk, exists immediately. And when an Action, in a Man’s Power, is proposed to Him, to be done to morrow; as to walk to morrow; He is no less obliged to have some immediate Will. For

‘ HE must either have a Will, to defer Willing about the Matter proposed; or must Will immediately in relation to the Matter proposed. And one or the other of these Wills must exist immediately; no less than the Will to walk, or not to walk in the former Case.

‘ WHEREFORE, in every Prospect of something to be done, which is in a Man’s Power to do He cannot but have some immediate Will.

IN fine, tho' great Stress is laid on the
 ' Case of suspending the Will, to prove Liber-
 ' ty; yet there is no difference between that,
 ' and the most common Cases of Willing, and
 ' chusing, upon the manifest Excellency, of
 ' one Object above another.

FOR a Man who suspends Willing about
 ' any Matter, Wills nothing in it at present;
 ' or rejects for a time Willing about it. Which
 ' Circumstances of wholly rejecting; and re-
 ' jecting for a Time; make no Variation, that
 ' affects the Question.

SO that Willing, or chusing Suspension,
 ' is like all other Choices, or Wills we have:
 ' And if so, then, I hope, I may assume, in
 ' like Manner, Thus also. *

P. G. As to the First. Whether the Supreme
 Cause is at Liberty to Will: or not Will? it is
 manifest he has not that Liberty. For let an
 Action in itself possible, be before Him, as
 presently to be done, namely, to create; the
 Will, in Him, to create, or not create, exists
 immediately.

~~For when God suspends Willing about any
 Matter, He Wills nothing in it at present.~~

♦ Inquiry, p. 39, 40.

AND

AND when an Action, in itself possible, is present to the first Cause, to be done by Him, humanly speaking, at some other Time, as to create at some other Time, He is no less obliged to have some immediate Will. For,

HE must either have a Will, to defer Willing, about the Matter before Him: Or must Will immediately in relation to such Matter. And one, or the other of these Wills must exist immediately; no less than the Will to create, or not to create, in the former Instance.

WHEREFORE, in every Case, of something, in its own Nature possible, before the divine Mind to do, the First Cause cannot but have some immediate Will, as well as every other intelligent Cause.

IN fine, tho' great Stress is laid on the Case of Suspence, in the divine Will, to prove a Liberty in the divine Mind; yet there is no difference in that, and the most common Cases of Willing and chusing upon the real Excellency of one thing above another.

FOR when God suspends Willing about any Matter, He Wills nothing in it, at present: or rejects, for a time, Willing about it. Which
Circum-

Circumstances of wholly rejecting, and, humanly speaking, rejecting for a time, make no Alteration that affects the Question.

SO that Willing, or chusing Suspension of Willing, is like all other the Choices, and Wills, in the Divine Mind. Q. E. D. In the next Place my Author says; *

A. C. 'LET us now see, Whether we are
' at Liberty to Will, or chuse One, or the o-
' ther, of two, or more, Objects, wherein We
' discern any Difference: that is, where one,
' upon the whole, seems more excellent than
' another: or where one upon the whole, seems
' less hurtful than another.

' AND this will not admit of much Dispute,
' if we consider what Willing is. Willing and
' preferring is the same, with respect to good
' and evil, that judging is, with regard to Truth
' or Falshood. It is judging upon the whole
' that One thing is better than Another: or not
' so bad as another.

' WHEREFORE, as we are to judge of Truth
' or Falshood, according to the Appearances;

* *Inquiry*, p. 40, 41.

‘so We must Will, or prefer, as things seem to
 ‘Us. Unless We can lye to ourselves, or think
 ‘that to be worst, which We think best.

‘* THIS I take to be sufficient to show,
 ‘that Man is not at Liberty to Will one, or
 ‘the other, of two Objects, between which He
 ‘perceives a Difference: and to account true-
 ‘ly, for all the Choices, of that kind, which
 ‘can be assigned.’ Again therefore I reply.

P. G. LET us now consider, Whether the
 first Cause, be at Liberty, to chuse one, or the
 other, of two, or more, Objects of his Power,
 which are before Him.

NOW as to this, let us consider. Whether
 He has Liberty to Will one, of two or more Ob-
 jects, in which there is a Difference? That is,
 where One, upon the Whole, is more excellent
 than another.

AND this will not admit of much Dispute, if
 We consider what Willing is. Willing and pre-
 ferring is the same, with respect to good and
 evil, that judging is, with regard to Truth and

* Inquiry, p. 44.

Falshood. It is judging upon the Whole, that
~~One thing is better than another.~~

Wherefore as the first Cause is obliged, by the
 Perfection of his Understanding, to judge of
 things, as they are in themselves; so He must
 Will, and prefer, things only, as they are good
 in themselves. Unless He can act contrary to
 his own essential Truth: and prefer that as best,
 which in fact, and in reality, is not so. Q. E. P.
 My Author goes on thus: †

A. C. ~~Be it~~, secondly, some of the Patrons
 of Liberty contend, that We are free in our
 Choice, among things indifferent, and alike:
 as in chusing out of two, or more, Eggs. And
 that, in such Cases, the Man having no Mo-
 tives from the Objects, is not necessitated to
 chuse one thing rather than another, because
 there is no perceivable difference between them:
 but chuses One, by a mere Act of Willing,
 without any Cause, but his own free Act. To
 which I answer,

By asking, 1. Whether this, and other In-
 stances like this, are the only Instances, in
 which Man is free to Will, or chuse?

2. If they are not the only Instances, those others should be assigned; and not such as are of no Consequence; and serve to no other purpose, but to darken the Cause, and Question.

3. If they are the only Instances, then We are advanced a great way in the Question, because there are few Objects of the Will, perfectly alike.†

* 2. THAT, when a Choice is made, there can be no Equality of Circumstances preceeding the Choice. For in the Case of chusing One, out of two or more Eggs; there is not a true Equality of Circumstances, and of Causes preceeding the Choice.

IT is not enough to render things equal to the Will, that they are equal or alike in themselves; all the various Modifications of the Man, his Opinions, Prejudices, Temper, Habits, must be taken in, no less than the Objects, which We chuse. As for example;

1. IN the Case of chusing one out of two Eggs, which are alike. There is first, in the person chusing, a Will to eat, or Use, an Egg.

† Inquiry, p. 45.

* Inquiry, p. 46, 47.

2. THERE is a Will to take but one, or one first,

3. Consequent to these two Wills, follows, in the Instant, the Choice of One. Which one is chosen, according as the parts of our Bodies have been framed, by an habitual Practice: or as the Parts are determin'd, by Circumstances, at that time.

4. THERE are, in all Trains of Causes that produce their Effects, which nearly resemble each other, certain Differences indiscernable, which yet in Concurrence with other Causes, as necessarily produce that Effect, as the last Feather laid on breaks the Horse's back; and as a Grain necessarily turns the Balance, between any Weights, tho' the Eye cannot discern which is greatest.

I ADD; we know, without such Discovery, that, if one Scale rises, and the other falls, there is a greater Weight in one, than the other: and that the least additional Weight, is sufficient to turn either Scale. And

* Inquiry, p. 48, 49.

‘ S O, likewise, we may know, that the least
 ‘ Circumstance in the Chain of Causes, that pre-
 ‘ ceed every Effect, is sufficient to produce that
 ‘ Effect. And

‘ A L S O know, that there must be Causes of
 ‘ our Actions, tho’ We do not discern them;
 ‘ by knowing, that every Beginning must have
 ‘ a Cause. *

‘ B Y which last Principle, we are as natural-
 ‘ ly led to conceive a Cause of Action, in Man,
 ‘ when we see not the Cause itself; as we are to
 ‘ conceive that a greater Weight determines the
 ‘ Scale, tho’ our Eyes discover no difference be-
 ‘ tween them.

‘ B U T let us put a Case of true Equality, or
 ‘ Indifference, and what I have asserted will more
 ‘ manifestly appear.

‘ L E T two Eggs appear perfectly alike to any
 ‘ Man: and let him have no Will at all to eat
 ‘ Eggs. † I say it is manifest no Choice could,
 ‘ or would, be made: and the Man is visibly
 ‘ prevented, in the beginning, from making
 ‘ any Choice.

* Inquiry, p. 50.

† Ibid. p. 51.

‘ For every Man experiences, that before he
‘ can make a Choice, among Eggs, he must
‘ have a Will to use an Egg, otherwise he would
‘ let them alone.

‘ AND he also experiences, in relation to
‘ things, the Objects of his Choice; that he must
‘ have a precedent Will to chuse, otherwise he
‘ would make no Choice. †

‘ IT is therefore contrary to Experience, to
‘ suppose any Choice can be made under an E-
‘ quality of Circumstances; and, by consequence,
‘ it is matter of fact, that, Man is ever determi-
‘ ned in his Willing, or Acts of Volition and
‘ Choice.’ And taking all this now for granted,
I argue in like manner.

P. G. THO’ some Patrons of Liberty con-
tend, that the first Cause is free, in his Choice,
as to things alike, or indifferent to him, they
are plainly mistaken. To illustrate which let us
suppose;

THAT preceeding to the Creation, there were
before the First Cause * two great Mundane

† *Inquiry*, p. 52.

* I hope I may be allowed to make a Supposition, of what
so many have contended for as a probable Truth: See Dr Bur-
net’s *Theoria sacra de Ovo Mundano*. If not, I hope the Reader
will observe, how necessarily I was led thereto, to preserve the
Parallel.

Eggs, out of each of which, God might equally have formed a World: and that having no Motive for the Eggs, he was not necessitated to chuse one of them before the other; there being at the instant of the Choice, no real difference between them.

And let us farther suppose, That He did make Choice of one Egg, out of which he formed this World, by a mere Act of Willing, without any Cause, but his own Act. Will such Patrons of Liberty say, that God, in such Case of Indifference, acted freely? If they do, I reply;

1. BY asking whether this, and other Instances like this, are the only Instances, in which God is free to Will, or chuse?

2. IF they are not the only Instances, such others should be assigned; and not such as are of no Consequence; and serve to no other Purpose but to darken the Question.

3. IF they are, then We are advanced a great way in the Question, because there are few Objects, even of the Divine Will, perfectly alike.

2. THAT when a Choice is made by the first Cause, there can be no Equality of Circumstances preceeding the Choice. For in this Case of his chusing one out of two great mundane Eggs,
in

in order to form a World out of one of them. There is not a true Equality of Causes, and Circumstances, preceeding the Choice.

It is not enough to render things equal to the divine Will, that they are equal in themselves; all the various Modifications of the divine Nature, the Attributes of God, and his usual Operations, must be taken in, and considered together; no less than the Eggs, or Objects, out of which he is to chuse. As for Example,

1. IN the Case of chusing one out of two or more Objects, in order to form a World out of one of them, which are in themselves equal. There is first in God a Will to chuse, and use an Egg, for such truly divine Purpose.

2. THERE is a Will in God to take but one of them, for such divine Use: and One first.

3. Consequently to these two divine Wills, follows, in the Instant, the Choice of One. Which one is chosen, according as the divine Dispositions have been usually modified by Practice: Or as the divine Operations, using such Object, are determined, by Circumstances, at such time. For,

THIS

THIS we may be sure, that several of the divine Choices have been determined by Circumstances, at such times when no Cause has arisen; from the consideration of the Objects themselves, for all the divine Measures are taken, according to Circumstances, determining their several Tendencies, at each proper Time. For,

As we know, that several of our own Choices have been made by Circumstances, at the proper Time, when no Cause has arisen from the consideration of the Objects themselves; why may We not conclude, that the same may happen to every other intelligent Cause or Being.

4. THERE are in all Trains of Causes, which preceed their Effects; and especially Effects which are like to each other, certain Differences, very minute, which yet, in concurrence with other Causes, as necessarily produce their Effects, as the last Feather laid on, breaks the Horse's Back: and as a Grain necessarily turns the Balance, between every Weight.

I ADD. We know without farther Disquisition, that, if the divine Mind be in Equilibrium, as this Case supposes: that if One Scale rises, and

and the other falls; there is a greater Weight in the One, than the other; and that the least additional Weight is sufficient to turn the Scale.

AND, by the same Rule, we may know, that the least Circumstance, in the Chain of Causes, which precede every Action, is sufficient to produce that Effect.

AND, also, safely conclude, that there must be Causes of the divine Choice, tho' we may not be able to discern them. This we may conclude from this Principle, that every Beginning must have a Cause.

By which last Principle, We are as naturally led, to conceive a Cause of Action in the divine Mind, when We cannot see the Cause itself: as We are to conceive, that a greater Weight determines the Scale, tho' our Eyes discover no difference between them.

BUT, let us put a Case of true Equality and Indifference, and what I have asserted will more manifestly appear. Let there be two Objects perfectly alike before the first Intelligence; and let Him have no Will to create from, or use, them. I say it is manifest no Choice could, or would be made by Him: and that God would

be prevented, in the Beginning, from making a Choice.

FOR, as every man experiences, before he can make a Choice among Eggs, he must have a Will to use an Egg, otherwise he would let both alone.

AND, as he also experiences, in relation to things, the Objects of his Choice; that he must have an antecedent Will to chuse, otherwise he would make no Choice: so is it, and must be, with every other intelligent Being.

IT is therefore contrary to Fact, to suppose, any Choice can be made under an Equality of Circumstances. And by Consequence, it is plain, that God is ever determin'd in his Willing; or Acts of Volition and Choice. *Q. E. D.*

* * *A. C.* I shall now consider the Actions of
 • Men, consequent to Willing; and see whether
 • Men be free in any of those Actions. And
 • here also We experience perfect Necessity.

* *Inquiry, p. 52, 53, 54.*

‘ If We Will thinking or deliberating on, a
‘ Subject: or Will walking or reading, or ri-
‘ ding: We find we must do these Actions, unless
‘ some external Impediment, as an Apoplexy; or
‘ some such intervening Cause hinders Us.

‘ And thus We are necessitated also, to let
‘ an Action alone; as we were to act accord-
‘ ing to our Will, had no such external Impedi-
‘ ment to Action happen’d.

‘ If also We change our Wills, after any of
‘ these Actions; even, after We have began
‘ any of those Actions; We find We necessarily
‘ leave off those Actions, and follow the new
‘ Will, or Choice.

‘ For a conclusion of this Argument, from
‘ Experience. Let us compare the Actions of
‘ inferior intelligent and sensible Agents, and
‘ those of Men together.

‘ It is allowed that Beasts are necessary A-
‘ gents: and yet there is no perceivable Diffe-
‘ rence between their Actions, and the Actions
‘ of Men. None such, from which they should,
‘ or may be deemed necessary Agents, and Men
‘ free Creatures.

' SHEEP, for instance, are supposed to be
 ' necessary Agents; when they stand still, or lie
 ' down; go slow or fast; turn to the right
 ' or left; leap and skip, as they are diffe-
 ' rently affected in their Minds; when they are
 ' doubtful or deliberate, which way to take;
 ' when they eat and drink; when they chuse
 ' the sweetest and best Pasture; when they
 ' chuse among Pastures indifferent, or alike;
 ' when they apprehend Danger, and fly from
 ' it; when they quarrel among themselves, and
 ' terminate those Quarrels by fighting; when
 ' they follow those Leaders, who go first; when
 ' they are obedient to the Shepherd and his
 ' Dog.

' AND why then should Man be deemed
 ' free in the Performance, of the same, and the
 ' like Actions.

' HE has indeed more Knowledge, than
 ' Sheep; he takes in more things as matter of
 ' Pleasure than they do; being sometimes mo-
 ' ved with Notions of Honour and Virtue; as
 ' well as, by those Pleasures he has in common
 ' with them.

‘ He is also more moved by absent things,
 ‘ and things future, than they are. He is al-
 ‘ so subject to more vain Fears, more Mistakes,
 ‘ and wrong Actions; and infinitely more Ab-
 ‘ surdity in Notions. *

‘ He has also more Power, and Strength,
 ‘ as also more Art and Cunning: And is ca-
 ‘ pable of doing more Good, and Mischief, to
 ‘ his Fellow-Creatures, than they are to one
 ‘ another.

‘ But those larger Powers, and larger
 ‘ Weaknesses, which are of the same kind
 ‘ with those of the Powers of Sheep, cannot
 ‘ contain Liberty in them; and plainly make
 ‘ no perceivable Difference between them, and
 ‘ Men; as to the general Causes of Action, in
 ‘ some intelligent and sensible Beings, no more
 ‘ than the different Degrees of those Powers,
 ‘ and Weaknesses, among the various kinds of
 ‘ Beasts, Birds, Fishes, and Reptiles, do among
 ‘ them.’ And then say I also;

P. G. LET us upon this foot also, consider the Actions of God, consequent to Willing; and here also We may observe perfect Necessity.

FOR if God Wills thinking, or deliberating on any thing, as on Creation, He must create; unless some intervening Cause divert Him. And then, He is as much obliged to let Creation alone; as he was before to act according to his Will, had no such Cause interven'd to divert him therefrom.

IF the Supreme Being also changes his Will, after any of those Actions; he necessarily leaves them off; and follows his new Will and Choice.

FOR a Conclusion of this Argument from Fact. Let us compare the Actions of Men, inferiour, intelligent Agents, with those of God; and We shall be the farther confirmed in our former Decisions,

It is allowed, (by *A. C. Esq;*) that Men are necessary Agents: That there is no perceivable difference, in this Case, between the Actions

tions of a superiour, or an inferiour Intelligent Agent; no such, in Degree, from which other inferiour intelligent Causes should be necessary; and the first Cause a free Agent.

MEN, for Instance, are supposed, (by *A. C. Esq;*) to be necessary Agents, when they stand still, or lye down; go slow or fast; turn to the right, or left; skip or leap from one thing to another, as they are differently affected in their Minds; when they are doubtful, or deliberate, which way to take; when they eat, and drink; when they chuse the choicest, and most delicate Food; when they chuse among Meats indifferent or alike; when they apprehend Danger, or fly from it; when they quarrel among themselves, and terminate their Quarrels by fighting; when they follow their Leaders; when they are obedient to their Prince, or his Ministers.

WHY then should the first intelligent Cause be deem'd more free than any other, in the Performance of the same, or the like Actions: He has indeed more Knowledge than Men; He takes in more things, as the Subjects of his Wisdom and Power; He is also more moved by things, past, present, and future, humanly

manly speaking, than they are; He has also more Power and Strength; and more Understanding and Wisdom; and is capable of doing much more Good to his Subject Creatures, than they are to one another.

BUT these larger Powers of Him, the first intelligent Agent, above other, his intelligent, inferiour Creatures and Agents; which are of the same Kind with the intellectual Powers of Men, cannot contain Liberty in them; and plainly make no perceivable Difference, between Him, and them, as to the general Causes of Action, in other inferiour intelligent Beings.

NO more than the different Degrees of those Powers, among the various kinds of Beasts, Birds, Fishes, and Reptiles, do among them.
Q. E. P.

* A. C. ' A SECOND Reason, which I A. C.
' Esq; urge, to prove Man a necessary Agent,
' is because all his Actions have a Beginning.
' For whatever has a Beginning must have a
' Cause; and every Cause, is a necessary Cause.

* Inquiry, p. 57, 58.

‘ If any thing can have a Beginning which
 ‘ has no Cause, then nothing can produce some-
 ‘ thing. And if nothing can produce some-
 ‘ thing, then the World might have had a
 ‘ Beginning without a Cause, which is a real
 ‘ Absurdity in itself.

‘ Besides, if a Cause be not a necessary
 ‘ Cause, it is no Cause at all. For if Causes
 ‘ are not necessary Causes, then such Causes
 ‘ are not suited to, or are indifferent to their
 ‘ Effects; and the Epicurean System of things
 ‘ is rendred possible; and this orderly World
 ‘ might have been produced by a disorderly,
 ‘ or fortuitous Concourse of Atoms; or, which
 ‘ is all one, by no Cause at all.

‘ For in arguing against the Epicurean Sy-
 ‘ stem of Chance, do We not say, and that
 ‘ justly, that it is impossible for Chance, ever
 ‘ to produce an orderly System of Things,
 ‘ as not being a Cause suited to the Effect.

‘ AND that an orderly System of things,
 ‘ which had a Beginning, must have had an
 ‘ intelligent Agent for its Cause; as being the
 ‘ only proper Cause to its Effect. *

* Inquiry, p. 59.

ALL which implies, that Causes are suited to have Relation to some particular Effects, and not to others; and if so, they can be no Causes at all, to those others.

AND therefore a Cause not suited to the Effect, and no Cause, are the same thing. And if a Cause not suited to the Effect, is no Cause; then a Cause suited to the Effect is a necessary Cause: For if it is not suited to the Effect, it is not suited to it, or is no Cause at all of it.

LIBERTY therefore, or a Power to act, or not to act, under the same and equal Motives, is an Impossibility, atheistical, and most absurd.

P. G. A SECOND Reason urged by A. C. to prove Man a necessary Patient, and which equally holds against the Divine Being is this. All Actions must have a Beginning; and whatever has a Beginning, must also have a Cause; and every Cause is a necessary Cause.

If any thing could have a Beginning which has no Cause, then nothing might produce something; and if nothing could produce something, then the World might have had a Beginning without a Cause; which is a real Absurdity in itself.

BESIDES

BESIDES, if a Cause be not a necessary Cause, it is no Cause at all. For if Causes are not necessary Causes, then such Causes are not suited to, or are indifferent to their Effects, and the Epicurean System of things is render'd possible; and this orderly World might have been produced by a disorderly or fortuitous Concourse of Atoms; or, which is all one, by no Cause at all.

FOR in arguing against the Epicurean System of Chance do We not say, and that justly; that it is impossible for Chance, ever to produce an orderly System of things, as not being a Cause suited to the Effect.

AND that an orderly System of things, which had a Beginning, must have had an intelligent Agent for its Cause; as being the only proper Cause to its Effect.

ALL which implies, that Causes are suited to have Relation to some particular Effect, and not to others; and if so they can be no Cause to those others.

AND therefore a Cause not suited to the Effect, and no Cause, are the same thing. And

if a Cause not suited to the Effect is no Cause; then a Cause suited to the Effect, is a necessary Cause. For if it is not suited to the Effect it is not suited to it, or is no Cause at all of it.

LIBERTY therefore in the Divine Mind, or a Power to act or not act, to create or not create, in God, under the same and equal Motives, is an Impossibility, atheistical, and most absurd. Q. E. D. And farther in the words of my Author retorted.

* P. G. LIBERTY is contended for by the Patrons of it; as a great Perfection, but the Imperfection of Liberty, inconsistent with Necessity, will more evidently appear, by considering the Perfection of being necessarily determin'd.

CAN any thing be perfect, which is not necessarily perfect? For, whatever is not necessarily perfect, may be imperfect, and is so by consequence.

IS it not a Perfection in God, necessarily to know all Truth? Is it not a Perfection in Him, to be necessarily happy? Is it not also a Perfection in Him, to do and Will always what is best?

FOR if some things may be indifferent to Him, as some of the Advocates of Liberty, at

* *Inquiry*, P. 62, 71, 75,

least, suppose; He cannot have any Motive, from his own Ideas; or from the Nature of Things, to Will One of them rather than another; and consequently, if He does, must Will One of them, without a Cause or Reason, which cannot be conceived possible of any Being; and is contrary to this self-evident Truth; that whatsoever has a Beginning must have a Cause. But,

IF Things be not indifferent to Him, He must be necessarily determined, by what is best.

BESIDES, as He is a wise Being, He must have some End and Design; and, as He is a good Being, things cannot be indifferent to him, when the Happiness of intelligent and sensible Beings depends on the Will he has, in the Formation of things. *

WITH what consistency therefore can those Advocates of Liberty assert God to be a holy, and good Being. Who maintain that some things may be indifferent to him; before he Wills either of them.

* Inquiry, p. 76.

† For all Authors agree, that the Will follows the Understanding; and that when two Objects are presented to a Man's Choice, one whereof appears better than another, He cannot chuse the worst; that is, cannot chuse Evil, as Evil.

AND since they acknowledge these things to be true, they yield up the Question of Liberty, to their Adversaries; who only contend, that the Will, or Choice, of the first Cause, in like manner, as that of other intelligent Agents, is always determin'd by what seems best. Q. E. P.

* AND thus I have proved, in well nigh the Words of A. C. Esq; I am secure upon his Topics, that Liberty from Necessity is contrary to Experience in Men, and contrary to Fact in the divine Being. That such Liberty is impossible; and, that if it be impossible, it is an Imperfection; and consequently inconsistent with the divine Perfections. And all this I have done, notwithstanding according to other Words of his. || *It is a Contradiction, in terms, to say, that God, or the first Cause, is not free.* As most certainly it is.

† *Inquiry*, p. 111.
 A *Dissert.* p. 12.

* *Ibid.* p. 115.

AND now, I think, I might draw to a Conclusion, but that the latter Performance of A. C. Esq; hath not, as yet, pass'd under our Review. Now, tho' I take it to be but a very faint Echo of the former Piece, excepting the trifling Discovery therein, (for which too he was beholden to his Antagonist, the late Dr Samuel Clarke) that Men, according to his Principles, are rather to be deem'd necessary Patients than necessary Agents; and the remarkable Triumph, and Remissness, throughout the whole; as if the Danger was all over; and the great Metaphysician being dead, Victory had nothing more to do now, but to declare on his Side.

I say, tho' the *Dissertation* is but a faint Echo of the *Philosophical Inquiry*, it shall, however, be as particularly considered and retorted as the other, but with this difference only. I shall leave my Author's Arguments, as levell'd against human Liberty to stand in their proper Places, in his Book. And only borrow them, for a while, to show, that they play equally against the divine Mind.

* P. G. The first Cause is apparently passive in his Affections, from the things of the Universe. Which Affection, or Sensation, is the immediate Result of an Object's affecting the divine Mind: which Affection in an Instant of Time, is as inevitably determined, in regard to it's Manner, as the Modes of Matter.

THAT the Divine Mind is passive in Reflection may be proved from its being the immediate Consequence of past Sensations affecting it, whose instantaneous Modes are likewise determined, in that the Divine Mind recognizes them, as they were, at their first Entrance into it.

Reflection is, in reality, no other than Consciousness; which, when it is exercised about material Objects, is, and may be, called Sensation: and when on Ideas, Reflection.

† If this Proof that the Soul is passive in Reflection were defective,

AS, I fear, it looks something like it, an Appeal

* The Retortion is mine. The Words and Arguments are of A. C. and to be found in the Places referr'd to.

† *Dissert.* p. 3, 4, 5.

to a Man's Conscience might be sufficient to convince him.

DOES any Man suppose, that the first Intelligence, any more than Man, recalls into his Mind Ideas not pleasing to Him? do they not forcibly intrude on Him? Or can he at pleasure, exchange a Train of less pleasing Thoughts, for a Succession of such, as will afford Him Delight? If not adieu even Freedom of Reflection in the Divine Mind.

WE cannot adequately explain how the Ideas of Sensation and Reflection are retained in the Divine Mind. Nor does it affect the Point in Debate: seeing, that in the retentive Faculty, which is called Memory, the Divine Mind must be allowed to be Passive.

THE Divine Mind being, by means of Sensation and Reflection, furnished with the Materials, about which its other Faculties of Reasoning and Judging are exercised.

* BY Reasoning, the Ideas, of which the Memory is possess'd, or which, at that time occupy

the Soul, are assembled into intellectual Images, or Propositions; on which the Judgment is exercised, in discriminating the dissimilar, and unlike Parts of them; from thence drawing Consequences, and determining their Propriety, or Unfitness to the Truth, or Falshood of any Proposition, or Action then in view.

THAT the Divine Mind is, and must be passive in Reasoning and Judging, appears from the Consideration, that in their respective Functions of compiling Propositions; and determining the Relation their constituent Parts bear to each other; the past Sensations, and Reflections, are their Standard.

THE Judgment only assents that this is like, or unlike that; which Assent the Divine Mind cannot force, in contradiction to the Reality of the Proposition.

THE Divine Mind, in contemplating any Proposition, can only have in View the several Modes, under which the Parts of it have been, at some time united, or severed in the Mind.

THESE

• THESE Ideas are the Maxims; from which all Reasonings are deduced: And as they make their Appearances to the first Cause, so will his Conclusions be about them.

THE Case of every intellectual Mind is this. It's Judgment, concerning the Truth of any Proposition, is determined, from the Comparison of the Assemblage of Ideas, that constitute it, each with the other: And referring them to some established Standard in the Mind; from which they receive the Sanction of true: Or are exploded as erroneous.

† P. G. I shall now endeavour to demonstrate that all the Actions of the Divine Mind, are necessarily determined; and that they are immediate Consequences of the last Judgment of the Understanding.

WE are pretty much unacquainted, it is true, with the Nature of the Divine Mind, but not perfect Strangers to its Affections or Operations. And therefore, in our explaining them, in order to make our Sentiments intelligible to others,

* *Dissert.* p. 7, 8.

† *Ibid.* p. 13.

We are reduced to the Necessity, of drawing Parallels from the things of the Creation. But care must be taken to make them adequate. I will therefore, with the utmost Perspicuity I can, state my Hypothesis, and then prove it.

THE Divine Mind is acted upon by Ideas, as Matter is by Matter. For, as the different Applications, of one Part of Matter to another, determines its various Modes: So the Perception of Ideas determines and actuates every Mind. That this Hypothesis is true, I thus prove *

MATTER is capable of receiving different Modes: So is the Divine Mind capable of receiving different Affections. A Particle of Matter tho' it admits of various Modes is identically the same Substance: So is a Mind, notwithstanding its receiving variety of Affections.

MATTER would remain in one determinate Mode, if no other Part of Matter were applied to alter it: so would the Mind of the Supreme Being be perpetually employ'd by one Affection, unless some intervening Idea diverted its Operation.

* *Dissert.* p. 14.

IF this be denied by the bare Assertion, that the Mind of the first Agent has a self-motive Faculty, of determining its own Operations; such Denial and Assertion prove nothing.

WE should justly ridicule a Man, who asserted, that a Machine, in Motion, was an Agent; tho' he saw not the Weight, nor Spring that occasion'd it to move; or were ignorant in the Laws of Gravitation or Attraction.

* AND We may equally pronounce Him absurd, who not truly contemplating the Causes, which communicate Motion to the Divine Mind, because He is not able to delineate the precise Manner of that Communication, should therefore affirm the Divine Mind to be self-motive; which he is still less able to account for, and to reconcile to Reason.

THE Application of Matter to Matter is so far the Occasion of its changing its pristine Mode, as without it, it would not have received a new One: so the Application of an Idea to the Divine Mind, is the Cause of its receiving a particular

* *Dissert.* p. 15.

Affection, which, otherwise, it would not have been conscious of.

WHEN any Person can explain to Me how material Objects operate upon an human Soul ; then will I undertake to account also, how material Objects affect the Divine Mind ; and exert the Understanding, and the Will of the Almighty to Action.

I HAVE as clear an Idea of the One, as of the other : know as well that my Mind, and that every other Mind, must be acted upon by Ideas, as that my Body is actuated by my Soul.

* IF these Premisses be admitted, as true, the Consequence, which unavoidably follows, is this. That the Divine Mind, and every other intellectual Mind, is actuated by the last Judgment of the Understanding.

BUT should my Hypothesis be erroneous, which I can't see ; I thus demonstrate, that the Divine Mind acts necessarily.

* *Dissert.* p. 16.

It is admitted by my Opponents, that every Mind, or intellectual Being, is passive, until, and in its last Judgment. And if so: when the Divine Mind has determined the Truth of any Proposition; or the Fitness of any Action, it is then going upon; the Action either follows, 1. The last Judgment of the Understanding. Or,

2. THERE is a Suspension of Thought, for some Time, in the Divine Mind: and then the first Cause is exerted into Action, in Correspondence with the last Judgment of his Understanding.

* 3. Or, The Divine Mind acts independent of, and unaffected by, any prior Judgment of the Divine Understanding.

ONE of these three must be the Case as to every intelligent Mind: and in each of them, the Action of every Mind is necessary. For,

If, as by the first Supposition, the Action of the first Cause, instantaneously follows his last Judgment, that Action is as evidently, the Con-

sequence of the last Judgment, as the Perception of an Object, is the unavoidable Result of the Object's affecting the Divine Mind, which is acknowledged necessary.

IF the second Proposition be true, the Action is, without doubt, the Consequence of the last Judgment of the Divine Mind, before that Suspension of Thought: or it is a new Judgment formed on the old Premises; which must still be allowed the last Judgment of the Understanding.

* IF, as in the third Case, the Divine Mind acts independent of any prior Judgment of the Understanding, its Action is involuntary, and consequently nothing. That is, no Action.

THIS Supposition also, of an Action, independent of any prior Judgment of the Understanding, admits the Divine Mind to be conscious it is beginning an Action, without any consideration to determine it to any manner of Action, or any Reason why it should do, or Abstain from it. This is admitting Necessity, in its utmost Latitude.

IN order to avoid this Dilemma (Fools that they were, for here is not the least Shadow of One). It hath been said by some, that the last Judgment of the Understanding is not the efficient Cause of the Soul's acting : but is admitted to be the Cause, *sine qua non* ; well, however, that is enough to maintain my Argument ; that the Divine Mind, as every other intelligent Mind, is necessitated in every particular Action, as, in this my Work, is stated and proved.

I WILL put an Instance of Action, in the most favourable Light I can, for Liberty in the first Cause, or God.

• GOD judges it best for Him to create : and in order to prove, that He has a Liberty to act, in direct Opposition to this his last Judgment ; He forbears : does not create.

IT is plain the first Cause is necessitated so to do, from the influencing Pleasure he receives from that Act, which induces Him to abstain, from what before He thought reasonable ; which Preference, is, in reality, the last Judgment of the Divine Mind ; and is necessary, in regard it was occasioned by some intervening Idea, which necessarily presented itself to his View.

IT may be thought indeed by some, *and those not a few*, that it is a debasing the Divine Mind to make it passive. It is, *they may say*, levelling it with a Balance endued with Perfection, *as the late Dr. Clarke had observed*, without a Power of beginning Motion.

TO this I answer. The Divine Mind, tho' it be necessitated to Action, by the last Judgment of the Understanding; yet is vastly superior in every degree, *to every other intelligent Mind*, endued with Perception and other Faculties.

* IT's Preheminence consists in this: That it is acted upon, in a more diversified manner, than that of other intelligent Agents; and in that its Faculties are more extensive: and in this, I conceive, consists the essential Difference, between the Soul of Man, and the Divine Mind.

AND now that the Argument is brought up to this Pitch, it is time for both to think of making an End.

A. C. hath debased the human Mind, to a Level with a Balance, endued with Perception, without a Power of beginning Motion.

AND I have shown, that his Arguments leave the Divine Mind, in no better Condition. And

what should I add more ; saving an Expostulation or two, and a Word of Conclusion?

IN the first place ; I think We may inquire, how it came into the Head of this Gentleman, to dedicate this his notable Dissertation to Truth? Was it to make amends for his perpetual Opposition to it? Or to convince the World, farther, if possible, that no one can labour hard to promote Error or propagate Slavery, but, in derision, or for a Blind, He must dedicate such his profligate Pains to Liberty or Truth? For my part I can see no other Aim, in such an Inscription : And if others can, they may, for me, keep the Secret to themselves. Let us now recapitulate, and conclude.

IF the Soul of Man, as *A. C.* contends, like a perceiving Balance, is only determined by Weight; and if, for the same Reasons, so is, and must be, the Divine Mind also; then there are nothing but necessary Patients, in the Universe. And without so much as a first Mover *. Unless *A. C.* with his late Friend Dr. *Clarke*, was here, *à priori*, with us too; and could ascend, at least in Imagination, beyond the first Cause, and so on in *Infinitem*.

* See the Review of the Argument *à Priori*, in Relation to the Being, and Attributes of God. LINTOT.

BUT if this was his Meaning, or can be the Meaning of any other now living Person, when He is arrived at God, and the first Cause, and is disposed to proceed farther; as my Conceptions can reach no higher than the first Being, He must, and shall, move on farther, without me.

BUT this, tho' One might think it sufficient, is not all neither, *A. C.* hath not only furnish'd us with an Universe of necessary Patients, without a first Mover: But hath helped us also to an Universe, in which there neither is, nor can be one Patient.

FOR I challenge Him, if now alive, (or any other living Person, who shall undertake the same Cause for Him) to show, that there can be so much as one necessary Patient, in a whole Universe, in which there is not one first, or self-Mover.

THERE was a Philosopher once; (and Philosophers we know have held strange Opinions; and not any, I think, stranger ones or more out of the way, than the late *A. C. Esq;*) who maintained in the Presence of *Diogenes*, that there was no such thing, as Self-motion or a Self-moving thing in the World.

NOW

NOW what did this same *Diogenes* do thereupon, who had an odd Humour of living in a Tub, but was otherwise a Man of great Vivacity and Spirit; did He, like your blind Fatalists, or rigid Stoics, or *Aetian* Hereticks, run on with a long Train of Syllogisms, and Reasonings, right or wrong, without Measure or End? No; He raised Himself, and began to move up and down, at his Discretion, and so put an End, to his Adversary's Harangue, with much Pleasantry and Humour.

AND when We are like to have a Controversy, with One or more of our blind Fatalists; it might be as well to exert an Act of free Will, and so leave them to themselves.

AND should such Fatalists be still inclined to run on with Motives, Arguments, Weights, last Feathers, Eggs, Grains, and I know what besides, I think We should do well, to let them alone till they were out of Breath, and had done.

AND then, if We could persuade ourselves to have Patience enough till such time. And I think these Remarks may shew, that it is not a small Portion of Patience is wanting, to make a curious Observer bear, with many of their Premises, and more of their Conclusions.

IF We could but have Patience, till our Fatalists have done: We might be sure to meet with them again, in a Maze, or a Labyrinth: and be able to treat with them then, upon our own, or even upon their Terms.

FOR in relation to many Points, such as are this of Human Liberty; a perfect Comprehension of which, does not come within the Reach of our Capacity, as is evident from the endless Disputes which have been made about it; tho' it may be easy to set forth the Truth, and establish it, to the Satisfaction of every reasonable Man; it may not be possible to unravel all the Perplexities, and solve all the Difficulties, which captious People may form about it. What must be done then, in such Case? Must We quit the Truths We are in Possession of, because We cannot dissipate all the Smoke and Dust, which is industriously, and perversely, stirred about Us? No: I think not. — Such a Desertion, and Dereliction, I am afraid, would endanger the total Loss, of that scantling of Knowledge which is assigned Us. What must We do then?

WHY be quiet a little, and sit still, till these Men have brought forth their own Positions: or led up their Arguments to their full Height; and then We cannot long be at a Loss to know what to do with them.

If they bring forth their own Positions, we shall then see, and very probably have it in our Power to show them, what a foolish Exchange they have made of Liberty for Necessity. Of a good and gracious God, for a blind Chance, or as blind a Fatality.

If they bring forth their Arguments only, and they be short and few, We may be able to show them, where they have changed their Terms, used false Mediums, or gone off, from the Point in hand.

If their pretended Arguments be intricate and long, and it will require much Time and Paper to lay open their several Sophisms, to discover their original Errors, or sever their vain Superstructures; then I think there is one Way left at least, saving to others the particular Forms of their Attacks, there is one Way left still; *viz.* to take their Arguments at once; allow all that they can say; and so show them where their Principles alone can conclude and end. And if they then find, that they break up in Absurdities, and end in nothing but manifest Inconsistencies and Contradictions; be they Persons of ingenuous Minds and Dispositions, they will see their leading Errors and Mistakes; and be persuaded to acknowledge, even their first Deviations

tions and Transgressions. For the Golden Rule, of Proportion, or of Three, proves backwards as well as forwards; and if there be an Error at the Circumference, We Know as well there must have been a Deviation, from the very Center, as if We were able to discern it, with our very Eyes.

TO make this still more familiarly plain, if possible, I desire Leave to recite a Fable.

A Traveller not knowing his Way to the next Town, took a Guide. The Guide led Him thro' many rough and unlikely Ways. The Traveller had many just Causes of Suspicion, and fear'd they went wrong. The Guide gave many pretended Reasons and Items, by which he undertook to demonstrate they were still in the right Way; and such, as tho' the Traveller could not altogether disprove, were by no means satisfactory to Him. At last they came to a Precipice. The Guide Himself did not dare to proceed. The Traveller turning about said to his Guide. Now, Friend, I see plainly that thou art not only wrong, but hast been so from the very Beginning. This I think wants no Application, and therefore I return to the Point in hand.

• THERE

THERE is nothing more evident in Nature; nothing that Man is more perfectly conscious of; nothing that He may more securely rely upon than this. That He hath a Principle of Self-Motion in Himself.

AND tho' *A. C.* made it an Objection against the late Dr *Clarke*; that He took such Principle of Self-Motion in Man for granted; and that it should have been proved by Him.

ITHINK He might as well have called upon Him to have proved at that time; that there was any such thing, as Self-Motion; or, which is the same thing in this Case, Motion in the World; or that He himself was then a living or moveable Creature.

WELL: however this plain Principle *A. C.* was pleased to dispute. And now to call over all his Premises, and Consequences again, would be a very tedious and wearisome Business; create much personal Dispute; introduce abundance of Chicanery probably on One side, if not on both; end in a sort of a Prize-Fight; and go off in Forgetfulness and Neglect.

AND

AND to introduce any new Explications of my own, would, it is likely, have been more fruitless still. *A. C.* probably if He could have done nothing else, would have been sure to commit my Solutions, with those given by Others before Me; and not failed, thus to have concluded, after his Usual manner; That there could be no great, or visible Truth in that Position, about the Expositions of which Men did so variously differ; and the clearing the Difficulties relating to which, was a Task, which no Man, as yet, had ever been able punctually to perform.

NOW to avoid this, I have taken another, and shorter Method. I have taken for granted all that *A. C.* hath offer'd upon this Subject, and have applied it to another Purpose, to which, I think, it does as equally belong. And so have endeavoured to show him his Mistake thro' his own Medium and Glass.

AND now if any Man thinks I have not fairly represented Things, or done *A. C.* Justice, let Him, if He pleases, rally his scattered, and baffled Forces again. We are both at last come to these Points, and as to Mine, there I am like to Abide, and Stand.

A. C.

As C. alleges the Human Mind cannot be free, because as a perceiving Balance it is moved by the last Feather that breaks the Horse's Back: or the last Grain which turns the greatest Scale.

Thereupon I contend, that if such is the Nature of the Human Mind, because it is rational and intelligent; then such also is the Condition of every other Mind rational and intelligent. And that then even the Divine Mind, upon A. C.'s Principles, tho' contrary to his express Acknowledgment, cannot be free.

I say farther, that if the Divine Mind, and first Cause is not free; there is no such thing, upon A. C.'s Principles, as Freedom, or Agency in the Universe.

And again also, that, if according to his Principles there be neither Freedom, nor Agency in the Universe, that then there can be no necessary Patients neither.

THESE, I think, are Absurdities and Contradictions enow to load any Proposition; or pretended Set of Arguments with, at One Time.

BUT I say farther, that A. C. himself was not a Stranger, nor wholly unacquainted with these

Inconsistencies, (tho', perhaps, for want of a Trial that Way, he might not perceive, how closely they attended his Scheme of Necessity.) since He hath so manifestly and roundly asserted; that *it is a Contradiction in Terms*, as questionless it is, to say; *that God, or the first Cause, is not Free.*

WHY then should any One hold either the Premisses or Conclusions, which tend only to the Confusion and Disturbance, of such so manifest, and so great a Truth. Perhaps they who are far gone in a blind Fatality, may not be able to discover the Points, where such fallacious Reasoning may either begin or end.

AND perhaps on that Account, it may be extremely difficult, if not altogether impossible, for any the most perspicacious Person to set them right.

BUT may they not be sure in the mean while, and made sensible with less Trouble that they are wrong? Is it not as plain that such a Method and Course of Arguments must be false which take all Freedom from Man: as it is manifest, those Reasonings cannot be true, which leave no Liberty to God.

PERHAPS

PERHAPS some may suspect that the Absurdities on the side of Human Liberty, may be equal to the Inconsistencies on the Point of Necessity. Let such Person then make them out, as he can, and display them, before Us, as he pleases.

WE say that Man was, and is still, left free by his Maker; but so as to have a Dependance on Him, who created, and doth still preserve Him,

WE maintain also that He is free in a World, with which by his Body he is connected: From the Influences of which too, whilst He breathes therein, he cannot be discharged.

WE affirm also that as a free Agent, He determines himself, tho' as a rational Being, not altogether without a due and fitting Regard to all proper Considerations and Motives.

AND where now is the Absurdity: Wherein the Inconsistency of any of these Positions, or Asseverations?

PERHAPS some may still urge, that Human Liberty is a Subject that they cannot perfectly comprehend; that there are Difficulties relating there-

thereto, which they are not able to clear up, and surmount. It may be so. Possibly We may not be able to say, thus far God concurs with Man, but no farther. To such a Degree or Point a Man may be influenced by proper Motives, but not beyond it. In this Respect he is connected to the World in which he lives, and in another disjoined from it. But what then? Because I do not, *a priori*, inspect the Views and Faculties of a rational Soul; and cannot thereupon determine, upon all Questions and Incidents relating to it; may I not *a posteriori* and by its Effects, know enough of it, as I do also of the Divine Mind; to maintain, that it never was in Bondage to any previous Cause or Being?

AND they who are not contented therewith; nor in other Respects with that measure of Understanding which Providence has assigned them, may go on puzzling themselves, and others, till the World is quite sated with their foolish Cavils.

BUT let them remember in the mean while, that the *Achillean* Spear which gives the Wound, will afford also the Remedy. And that nothing is so sovereign against the biting of a Viper, as the Powder prepared, and the Oil extracted from his own Substance.

I Had

I HAD almost forgotten the second Part of my Undertaking ; which however now, I think, may be dispatch'd in a few Words.

WE have seen already, that if the human Mind cannot be free, because, as *A. C.* expresses it, it is determined, like a perceiving Balance, by the last Grain or Feather : Neither can the Divine Mind, upon the same Principles, be in any regard more free ; because that also, as a rational, and intelligent Mind, is determined by the last Grain and Feather. But then it follows reversely also. That,

IF the Divine Mind be free, notwithstanding, as a rational Mind, it is determined by the last Grain or Feather : then may, and, upon the same Principles, is also, the Mind of Man, as an intelligent and rational Mind, free ; altho' that is also determined, upon *A. C.'s* Principles, by the last Grain or Feather.

SO that now the Person who is disposed to take up the Dispute, on the Part of the late *A. C.* Esq; hath one, and either, of these two Things to chuse.

I. EITHER that the human Mind is not free ; because, as a perceiving Balance, it is weighed
down

down perpetually by the last Grain and Feather :
 And the Divine Mind not free also, because it is
 in like manner determined; notwithstanding
 the plain and open Declaration of *A. C.* and the
 eternal Truth, upon which it is founded. *That*
God is free, and that it is a Contradiction in Terms,
to suppose the first Cause not so.

OR else the human Mind is free, *tho' moved*
as a perceiving Balance; and the Divine Mind al-
 so, according to *A. C.*'s open and most unquesti-
 onable Declaration, *that God and the first Cause*
is free; and that it is a Contradiction in Terms, and
 most manifestly such, *to suppose He is not so*; any
 thing in *A. C.*'s two Treatises, above conside-
 red, to the contrary notwithstanding.

F I N I S.